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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model of industrial structure and product
variety when technology is characterized by increasing returns to
scale.

Unlike theories of increasing returns in markets that are

contestable, we assume here that an entrant must incur a fixed cost
prior to entering the market.
subsequently.

Pricing and output decisions occur

When entry and pricing decisions are sequential in

this way the nature of the resulting market equilibrium is quite
different from that which arises when they are simultaneous.

Pro-

duct variety is likely to be lower and there is room for excess profits.
When there is more than a single producer consumers benefit from
having majority tastes.

Entry deterrence behavior on the part

of an initial entrant can reduce social welfare.
of tastes can benefit or harm consumers.

Growth and convergence

An incentive may arise for an

efficient firm to sell its technology to relatively inefficient producers.

1.

Introduc tion
This paper develops a model of product variety to examine how

competi tion among actual and potentia l produce rs determin es the charact eristics
of products produced .

The model is used to conside r the effects of market

size, barriers to entry, and differen ces in tastes between differen t groups
of consume rs on the configu ration of models produce d, welfare , and distribu 
tion of income.

The incentiv e for a firm with a superio r technolo gy to

sell that technolo gy to other actual and potenti al produce rs is also
analyzed .
We model an industry that produces a differen tiated commodity
that embodies a charact eristic that may be represen ted by a real number.
Each consume r has an ideal model of that conmodi ty, and will buy other
models only when the.pric e is sufficie ntly

lower.

Diversi ty in tastes

is represen ted by differen ces among consume rs in their ideal models.
In this respect our formula tion follows from the location models develope d
by Hotellin g (1929), Lancast er (1971), Eaton and Lipsey (1975), Prescot t
and Vissche r (1977), Salop (1979), and Lane (1980), among other.

We

depart from these authors , however , in represen ting the distribu tion
of consume r tastes by discrete points rather than a continuu m along a
line or circle.

This represe ntation allows us to examine the effects

of differen ces in the relative number of consume rs with differen t tastes
very easily.

In contras t, models that represen t the distribu tion of

consume r tastes as a continuu m have difficu lty charact erizing the distribu tion
of tastes as anything but uniform (See Eaton and Lipsey, 1975).

Our

approac h, in particu lar, allows us to distingu ish minorit y and majority
groups of consume rs.
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We follow Prescott and Visscher (1977), Eaton and Lipsey (1978),
and Lane (1981) in describin g equilibriu m as the outcome of a two-stage
process.

In the first stage firms conmit themselve s to producing a
In the second

particula r model of a commodity; they do so sequentia lly.

stage firms that have entered detennine prices and outputs_ given the set
of finns that entered initially and the models they establish ed.

We

assume perfectio n in the sense that actual and potential producers make
their entry and model choice decisions calculatin g correctly the effects
of their actions on the second stage outcome.
By treating entry and model choice as decisions that are made
prior to price and output decisions 9 the choice of model becomes a
componen t of a firm's behavior to deter entry.

By committ:ing itself

to produce a particula r model a firm can deter entry by other firms. Furthermo re,
because firms enter and establish models before price and output decisions
are made, free entry does~ enforce average cost pricing.

Lancaste r,

(1971), Spence, (1976), Salop (1979), Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982),
on the other hand, assume that firms may enter and exit in response
to the price and output decisions of existing firms.

As a consequen ce

the threat of entry leads to average cost pricing by existing firms.
Treating entry and pricing decisions as sequentia l rather than as simultane ous
actions leads to very different conclusio ns to a number of questions .
For example, because a firm may bias its choice of model
to deter further entry, the threat of entry
of a market can reduce welfare.

or expansion in the size

A firm~ by appropria te choice of a

model, may be able to establish an artificia l monopoly.

In the consequen t

equilibriu m welfare is lower than if the first entrant had been granted
a franchise monopoly, i.e.• if further entry were prohibite d.

It is also
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the case that when model choice is a component of entry deterrenc e strategy,
the opening of internati onal trade can yield an outcome that is Pareto
inferior to autarky.

We develop this point at greater length elsewhere .

(Eaton and Kierzkow ski, 1982).
Turning to the second stage of the determina tion of equilibriu m,
the price and output decisions of firms that have previousl y entered
and committed themselve s to particula r models, we show that there are
a continuum of Nash-Cou rnot equilibri a when there are two entrants.

The

Nash-Ber trand equilibriu m concept• on the other hand, does not yield any

unless the models they produce are very different and tastes are very
disparate .

This nonexiste nce problem is similar to that pointed out

by d'Aspremo nt, Gabszewic z and Thisse (1979) for the Hotelling model
in which two firms compete for a continuum of consumers along a line
segment.

These authors show that existence reemerges when disutilit y

or transport cost is quadratic rather then linear in distance.
quadratic costs does
at discrete intervals , however.

Intro.uci ng

existence when consumers are located

To obtain a unique, well-defi ned equilibriu m·

in prices and outputs we therefore introduce an alternati ve equilibriu m
concept that assumes more sophistic ated beliefs on the part of each firm
about the reactions of its competito rs to its decisions .

This alternati ve

equilibriu m concept, which we call a semi-reac tive Bertrand equilibriu m,
does yield a unique solution in pure strategie s for the problem we consider
here.

The conjectur es on the part of each firm about its rival's behavior

assumed in our equilibriu m definitio n have the property of being locally
correct, unlike the Nash-Cou rnot and Nash-Ber trand conjectur es
1981).

(See Bresnahan ,
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The outline of the paper is as follows.

Section

forth our assumptions about technology and preferences.

2

sets

Section 3

characterizes the market equilibrium that obtains. section 3.1 treating
the

price and output competition that arises

among a given number of

entrants and section 3.2 the sequential entry of firms in the previous
stage.

Section 4

considers the effects of the threat of entry on

welfare and the distribution of income.
of entry can reduce welfare.

Here we show that the threat

The effect of an increase in the number

of consumers is discussed in section 5.

One result is that an increase

in the number of minority consumers can have a Pareto worsening effect.
Another is that when two firms have established production. consumers
typically benefit from an increase in the number of similar consumers
-but are adversely affected by an increase in the number of consumers with
different tastes.

Section 6 considers the effect of the dssparity of

tastes between groups of consumers on their welfare.

Up to a point consumers

benefit from buying in an economy in which other consumers'
tastes are not too different from their own.
rivalry among producers.

The proximity creates more

At some point this rivalry inhibits entry.

r~wever, thereby leading to monopoly and leaving consumers worse off.

Section 7 examines the issue of the transfer of technology between
firms.

It is shown that a firm with unique access to a superior technology

may be able and willing to sell that technology to a subsequent entrant
if (i) no other entrant would otherwise have entered, (ii) tastes among
consumers are sufficiently different, and (iii) the number of total consumers
is sufficiently large.

A transfer of technology among two successful

entrants is sustainable, however;· only when the entrant with the superior
technology is restricted to the smaller market.
remarks appear in section 8.

Finally, some concluding
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2.

Technology and Preferences
We follow Lancaster (1971) in considering a differentiated commodity that

embodies some characteristic Z that may be represented by a real number.

Pro

duct differentiation is thus isomorphic to location on a line of infinite
length.

A particular model of the commodity embodies some characteristic

z.

We also assume that production occurs at increasing returns to scale.
There is a fixed cost K that must be incurred to produce a particular model
and there is a constant marginal cost of production c.

The total cost of

producing an amount x of a particular model is therefore K + xc.

This

specification of technology is found, for example, in Salop (1977) and Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977).

We assume in addition, however, that a firm must incur

the fixed cost Kand coI11ID.it itself to a particular model before the level of
output and price are determined.

Thus at the time the firm establishes output

and price the cost K is sunk and the model of the product it produces is
determined.
We assume, in keeping with other literature on differentiated products,
that a single firm can produce no more than a single model of the product.

There

The preferences of each individual i are characterized by a parameter 0.l.
that denotes the individual's ideal model of the commodity.

His utility declines

as the model he consumes becomes more distant from his ideal.

For concreteness

we adopt the form of the utility function used by Salop (1977):

where Zi is the model consumed by individual i, pi the price paid:for it, and Y
his income.

This functional form implies that the individual demands one unit

of the commodity if it is available at a price p~~lei-zil and zero units

6

otherwise.

If more than one variety is available the individual consumes the

is at a minimum, if this amount is less than or
model for which pi+ je.i - z.j
i
equal top.
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3.

Market Equilibrium
Consider a market that consists of two types of individuals, each char

acterized by a different taste parameter ei, i
Let

e2

~

= 1, 2 and numbering ni, i = 1, 2.

0 .
1

Equilibrium in the market for the commodity is established in a two-step
First, firms incur the fixed cost Kand select models.

process.

Second, firms

determine output levels and prices given the models that were established in
the first stage.
profits.
3.1

The objective of a potential entrant is to maximize expected

1

Price and Output Equilibrium
We analyse the second stage of the process, output and price determination

given establishes models, first.

We then turn to the issue of firm entry.

Pricing equilibrium is discussed according to the number of entrants.
A Single Firm

3.1.1

Consider first the case in which a single entrant has established a model
z .
1

It may choose to sell only to the market closer to z 1 (i.e., the one for

which lz 1 - eil is lower), and earn a maximum of

[p -

lz

1

else to sell to both markets, in which case he must set p

- ail- c] ni - Kor
~

p

= p - max

the second or first option is more attractive as
(p - c) (1 - A)> lz
<

1 -

e2 1-AIZl - e2 I

where A= n /(n + n A the proportion of type 1 consumers. Assuming that any
2
1
1
production is profitable, selling to the broader set of consumers is more
attractive when (i) the reservation price pis high relative to marginal cost;
(ii) the size of the closer market is small relative to the entire marke~ and
(iii) the closer market is not substantially closer.
3.1.2

Two firms
Consider now the situation in which two firms have established models

8

z1 and z2 • Assume, for the moment, that 0
1
firms to
costs, c

~

z1 .:::z 2 ,::: 0 • We constrain the two
2

have the same overhead cost K but allow them to have different marginal

1

and c

2

respectively.

We assume that the firms must charge both types

of buyers the same prices, i.e. price discrimination between markets is infeasible.
The output and pricing decisions of the two firms, given

z1

and

z2 ,

thus

constitute a standard duopoly problem modified to incorporate different product
characteristics.

The standard equilibrium notions applied to such problems are

the Nash-Cournot and Nash-Bertrand concepts.
very different outcomes.

As is well !mown, they can yield

It is also the case that each raises several dif

ficulties for the problem we consider here.
Consider first Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
two firms as q
(2)

1

and q

2

Denoting the outputs of the

respectively, any outcome q * , q * , p * , p * , such that
1
2
1
2

* + q2* = nl + n2'
ql

if ql* < n l

J

>

p*
2

~ C

0

if q * > o
2
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-where p * and p" constitute
2
1

the two firms' respective output prices, is

*

*

An attempt by firm i to increase qi above qi given qj, j ~ i,

an equilibrium.

will drive the price to zero in whichever market the increment is sold, thereby
lowering firm i's profits.

* j
* given qj,
Reducing qi from qi,

1

i, will reduce

The Nash-Cournot equilibrium concept thus fails to identify

profits by p~]. - c ]..•

a single or even a countable number of outcomes.
Consider the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, however.

Define

Taking firm l's price as given at p , firm 2

the distance between the two models.

1

will choose p slightly below
(3a)

p

2

= p1

- 0

or at

as
(3c)

(pl -

c2) (nl + n2) ~ [ max (pl +

o-

Pz

If the resulting

o,P - I~ -

< c , firm 2 will not produce.

2

Z2 I)

-

c2] n2

To break ties

we assume that,

if (3c) obtains with equality, firm 2 chooses (3b).
In other words, the second firm may sell at the maximum price at which its
product is attractive to both types of consumers (3a) or else may sell at a price
attractive only to consumers with tastes relatively closer to the product firm 2
produces (3b).

Condition (3c) determines which will yield higher profits.

Similarly, firm 1 will choose p slightly below

or at

as
(4c)
Let

(p

f1

2

-

and

o-

c ) (n
1

Pz denote

1

+ n 2) ~

(max

the values of p

(p
1

2

+ o,

and p

2

p - lz1

- 0 1 1)

-

c 1] n 1

at which (4b) and (4c) both hold with

10

equality.
Equation (3) constitute firm 2's reaction function to firm l's price while
(4) is firm l's reaction function to firm 2's price.
Figure 1 for the case in whicht +
1

o .:s_ p + le 2

They are illustrated in

z2 1 and f 2

-

+

o < F + lz1

-

e1 1.

The curve ABCD constitutes the second firm's reaction function to p
A'B'C'D' is

while
1
response to p • Along the segment B'C the second firm
2

firm l's

tries to sell to both types of consumer; p

1

and p

2

both fall to point C.

price'p is the price at which (3c) holds with equality.
1

The

At this point firm 2

raises its price from C to B, making sales to both types of consumers attractive
to firm 1.

Firm 1 now lowers its price to compete with firm 2 for type 2 consumers.

Prices are driven down along BC' to C', at which point type 2 consumers are no longer
attractive to firm 1, since-p is the price at which (4c) holds with equality. Firm
2
1 raises its price from C' to B'. The cycle repeats. The discontinuity of firm
2's reaction function between B' and C' and firm l's between Band C eliminates the
possibility of a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in pure strategies.

as the reader may verify on figure 1.
~

2

o
•

>

and p

2

I 02 - z_:l'I does an

I.

=p-

102

in that market.

- z
2

1:

Since-13

equilibrium

p

I or,2 < p
Only when p > p - lz - e I and
1
1
1 obtain. At this equilibrium p = P-1 z
1
1

~his discontinuity persists when either

-p1

.:s_

- jz - e
1

1

-

each firm sells to its closer market at the monopoly price

1

and1i both rise with

o,

equilibrium is more likely to

obtain the greater the distance between the two firms. 2
Modifying the definition of Nash-Bertrand equilibrium by allowing each f_irm
to incorporate the other firm's response to its own price leads to a well-defined
equilibrium in pure stategies, howeve~ that is independent of the firms' distance
apart.

3

_e 1 1

We adopt the following, modified definition of Bertrand equilibrium.
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Pz

~

/

/

/

/

I

A

-

Pz

/

/B

1,

D

/

1/
-. 7f- -

-

/

I

/
/

A

/

/
/
C

/
A'

/

/(
I
'i
Figure 1.

P1
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Definitio n:

*

{p., i
1

=

1,

...

If n firms have establish ed models Z, •• , Z , the prices
1
n
, n} constitut e a semi-reac tive Bertrand equilibriu m if and only

if for each firm j:

(i) given the prices {pi,
*

i # j} firm j cannot earn a

higher profit at any price below p~ and (ii) at any price above p~ at least
one
J
.
J
firm i # j can earn a higher profit at a price below p: or else p~ is the
•

J

monopoly price in at least one market.

The semi-reac tive Bertrand equilibriu m price vector and the correspon 
ding profit level of each firm are functions of the establish ed models
Z1 , ••• zn and are denoted {p: (Z), i

= 1, .•• n)

and

{n:

(Z), i

= l, ••• n}

respectiv ely.
In this equilibriu m each firm takes other firms' prices as given when
contempl ating price reduction s.

In consideri ng price increases , however,

each firm takes into account the incentive it may create for any other firm
to lower its price.

At the point of equilibriu m this conjectur e constitut es

the locally correct conjectur al variation (see, e.g., Bresnahan (1981)).

Any

firm not located very close to another firm can reduce its price slightly with
out creating an incentive for any other firm to reduce its price.

It cannot

raise its price without creating an incentive for a competing firm to lower its
price unless it is charging the monopoly price in one market.
Returning to the two firm case consider firm 2's decision to set p ,
2
given p • Selling to both markets requires setting Pz below
1
(5a)

p

2

= p1

-

0
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If firm 2 sells only to its own market at some price p
incentive to firm

1

to charge just below

Pz - o,

2, it

provides an

selling to both markets,

iff

The highest price that firm 2 can charge without inducing firm 1 to lower
its price from p

1

is thus given, from (Sb), by

Firm 2 will thus set

Pz

= p

1 - o or p 2

=

p2 as

o - c2) (nl + n2) ~ (p2 - c2) n2
Given p , firm 1 may choose p just below
2
(6a)

p

1

= p

2

- 0

and sell to hot:h

m::irkPt-i::: -

Selling to type 1

rnnc,11m1>rc,

only

it can ch.arge

as --much as

wi th0 ut attracting entry by firm 2.

Selling to both markets rather than

just to type 1 consumers yields higher on lower profits as
(6c)

14

Figure 2 illustrates the two reaction functions implied by (5) and (6).
If firm 1 charges a price above
(7)

P1* =

(1 - >-)

2

cl+ k2 + (2 - >.) o
2
1 - >. + >.

then firm 2 will charge p

1

- o and attempt to sell to both markets.

Both

prices will then be bid down along DC.

Similarly, if firm 2 sells at a price

above p* , prices will fall along D'C'.
2

If firm 1 sets p

will respond by selling p

2

on the segment AB.

raising its price until p* is reached.
1

1

below p * , firm 2
1

i-irm 1 can raise its profits by

Beyond this price firm 2 will respond

by lowering rather than by raising its price.
The threshold price for firm 2 is

(8)

P_z *=

2
+ ;\)
+ (1 - >.) c + (1
__o
__
_>. c_::.._
1
2 _ _ _ _,;;;___

, point Bin figure 2, thus constitutes a semi
The price combination p* , p*
2
1
--i.
if firm 1 raises its price above p* firm 2,
reactive Bertrand equilibrium:
1

action, firml will thus not raise p •
1

Lowering p , on the other hand, given
1

p2 , cannot raise firm l's profits. Similarly for p •
2
Several conclusions follow from (7) and (8):
(i)

If the two firms have the same marginal cost (i.e., if c 1 • c 2 • c), then
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D'

/
/
/

/
/
/

/

/
/
/

Figure 2

D
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C

+

C

+

The firm selling to tte smaller number of consumers will charge the higher
price.

This firm's market is the less attractiv e one, and it can charge a

higher price without providing an incentive for the other firm to enter.
(ii)

If, in addition to c

(i.e., if

o=

0)

then p *
1

1

= c 2 , the two firms produce the same models,

= p *2 = c;

i.e., the reactive Bertrand equilibriu m

price equals the marginal cost of productio n.

This price also

to the Nash-Bert rand equilibriu m for this case. 5

correspon ds

If 6 = 0 while c

1

> c ,

the condition p* > c would be violated. Firm 1 would not produce while
1
1
firm 2 would set p just below c •
2
1
(iii) If the two firms have the same market sizes (A= 1/2) then
(.7")

p*
1

= (1/3) c1 + (2/3) c + 2 o
2

(8")

p*
2

= (2/3) c + (1/3) c + 2
2
1

2

6

Both firms' marginal costs affect each firm's price; but the firm with the
lower marginal cost charges the higher price.
(iv)

The greater the differenc e between the two models the higher the price

each will charge.

In equilibriu m firm 1 earns a profit

n

1

- K

while firm 2 earns

- K

17

Not surprisingly, rr

1

rises (and rr

2

falls) as firm 2's cost of production

rises relative to firm l's (i.e., as c

2

- c

1

rises).

The absolute levels

In addition, both firms' profits rise as their products

do not matter.

become more different (i.e., as o rises).

Finally, substituting

shown that both firms' profits rise when the total market size increases
(i.e., as n

1

+ n 2 rises) holding A constant, and that each firm's profits

rise as its share of the market (A for firm 1 and 1 - A for firm 2) rises,
given the total market size, n

1

+ n 2 • Thus, even though the firm with the

larger market must charge the lower price to preclude entry by the other
firm, its larger sales volume more than compensates it.
3.1.3' Three or More Firms
Consider the case in which three firms have established models 2 , 2 , 2
2
1
3
where 0 <Z <Z <23-~.0. .
1 1 2
2

It is straightforward but tedious to establish that in a

reactive Bertrand equilibrium at most only two firms will sell in positive
amounts or else at least two firms will sell at their marginal cost.

(llb)

>

C

3

then only firms 1 and 3 will produce, selling p
1
p

3

= c

2

If

+ (2 - z2 ) respectively.
3

= c 2 + (2 2 - z1 ) and

If only (lla) is reversed, firm 2 will

displace firm 1, selling to type 1 consumers at p

3

=

c

1

- (2

2

- 2 ), while
1

if only (llb) is reversed firm 2 will displace firm 3, selling to type 2
consumers at p

3

= c? - (2

one or both firms as
C

3

-

3

- z ).
1

If both are reversed firm 3 will displace

18

In the event that (lla) is replaced by an

equality while (llb) continues

to hold both firms 1 and 2 will sell at marginal cost to type 1 consumers.
Similarly if (llb) is replaced by an

.equality while (lla) continues to

hold both firms 2 and 3 will sell at marginal cost to type 3 consumers.
Given that all firms have incurred the fixed, swik cost Kat least" one
firm will earn negative profits.

19

3.2

Model Equilibrium

In Section 3.1 we discussed how in equilibrium outputs, prices and
profits are determined

among a group of established producers.

consider the entry decision itself.

We now

We follow Prescott and Visscher (1977) and Lane

(L9so) (i) in treating entry and model choice as determined prior to price

and output decisions and (ii) in treating the entry decision as sequential
rather than simultaneous.

This second assumption means that each entrant

decides whether or not to enter taking as given the model choice of previous
entrants and assuming that subsequent potential entrants will behave similarly,
choosing to establish a model or not. taking its own entry and model as given.
All potential entrants are assumed to maximize profits and to be perfectly
informed about the distribution of tastes and about each other's technologies.
The equilibrium number of entrants and their models can be determined
via the backward induction method of dynamic progranuning.

Consider the case

in which n firms have entered and established models z 1 , ••• ,zn.

For this

set of models to constitute an equilibrium no additional firm can establish
a model and earn nonnegative profits in the resulting equilibrium; i.e.,

max Il (Z 1 , ••• ,Zn;Zn + 1 ) < 0

~+1

*
Let Zn+

(z , ••• ,Z ) denote the value of Zn+ 1 that attains V (Z 1 , ••• ,Zn)
0
1
The nth firm to enter will choose Zn, taking z 1 , ••• ,Zn _ 1 and the
1

*
(Z , ••• ,Zn)
function Zn+
1
1

as given, to attain

20

* + 1 (Z 1 , ... Zn))}
max {rr(z , ... ,Zn,Zn
1

z

n

Here

denote the value of Z that attains V(Z , ... ,Z
n
1
n
entrant chooses its model Zito attain

1

).

In general, the i'th

max {II(Z , ••• ,z.

z.

.

1

l.

l.

where, as before,

)) =

), ••• ,Zn+ 1(

) , ... ,z (
n

))

as long as V(z , ••• zi,zi + (z , ••• Zi), ••• ,Zn(z , ••• zn _ )) < 0
1
1 1
1
1
We may now establish some propositions about the models that will be
established in a market with two classes of consumers.
First, these will be at most two producers.

Section 3.1.3 establishes

that in a market with three producers at most two will sell positive amounts
or else two firms will sell at marginal cost.

In either case at least one

firm will sustain negative profits. 6 This firm would not choose to enter.
Consider now the second entrant's decision.

It takes the first firm's

entry and its model, Za, as giveff, and chooses its model, Zb, to maximize
its profits.

It need not concern itself with further entry.

Zb > Za it will realize profits of

If it sets
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while, if it set Zb < Za its profits are

The first expression is maximized at Zb = 0 2-while the second is maximized

= 01 •7

at zb

Thus, given za, firm 2 sets zb

= e1

or Zb

= 02

as n ~(za, 0 ) ~ rr 2 (za, e1 ), assuming that the larger is nonnegative. Other
1
2
wise it does not enter at all. In either case there will be no further
entry.
Consider now the first firm's entry decision, which is considerably more
It must consider (i.) whether it can preclude further entry;

complicated.

(ii) if so, if it is profitable to preclude further entry; and (iii) if it
does preclude further entry, whether it should sell to one or to both types
of consumers.
The first entrant can preclude further entry if for some value of

Z ,V(Z )
a
a
or,

= max

[IT(Z ,0 ),IT~(Z ,0 )] < 0
a 1
a 2

2)
a

where

2
A(Cb - ca)+ (1 - A+ A ) K/nl

]1<2 -

equivalently, if there exists a Za e (Z,
-a

and
(15b)

za

= 01 +

l

A)

That such a Z

exists is more likely (i) the more similar are tastes (i.e.,

the smaller 0

-

a

2

e1 ), (ii) the stronger the first entrant's cost advantage

(cb - ca), and (iii) the larger the fixed cost K.
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If the first entrant does not block further entry, then the second
entrant will choose either Zb = 0 1 or Zb = 0 2 •
chooses Zb

If the second entrant

= 0 1 the first entrant's profit are maximized when Za = 0 2 .

Converse ly, when Zb = 0 2

the first entrant's profits are at a maximum

If the first firm sets Za = 0 1 the best the second firm
can do is to set Zb = 0 2 • Thus if the first firm does not deter entry

when Za

= 01 .

~ n •
2
1
Therefore , in an equilibriu m in which both entrants are present Za = 01

it will set Za = 0 1 or Za

= 02 as n 1

~ n .

2

We assume that n

We do not

We now enumerate the types of outcomes that can occur.

Instead we discuss

attempt to provide condition s that lead to each one.
some examples.
No entry.

(i)

If both

(p

-·c) n

are negative there will be no entry.

1

- K and [

Here 0

p-

= 102 -

(0

2

e1

0)-

I /

c] (n1 + n 2 ) - K
2, the model

halfway between tastes in the two markets.
(ii)

One entrant selling to.!. single market.

There may be only one firm selling to only type one consumer s.
further entry,to maximize profits it will establish Za
necessary to deter entry, set Za > 01 •

With no

= 0 1 or, if it is

For the case in which A= 2/3 and

7K

iff 02 - el~ 15n
ca= cb, the firm can set Za = 0 1 and not deter entry
2
7K
an
deter
to
0
>
Z
set
must
If this condition does not obtain it
15n
a- 2
2
are given
profits
entrant's
entrant from establish ing Zb = e • The single
2

by

(16)

II

a

=

(iii)

[p

(Z

a

- 0) - c] n

l

1

- K

One entrant selling ~ both markets.

both types of consumers .

A single firm may sell to

With no further entry, to maximize profits it will

establish Za = 0 but may find it necessary to set Za < 0 to deter
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entry.

For the case in which >.. = 2/3 and ca=

and not deter entry iff 0

-

2

- 0

7K

< r:::--.

1 - olll

~

the firm can set Za = 0

If this condition does not obtain

7K

it must set Z < 0 + to prevent an entrant from establishing Zb = 0 .
1
a - 1
12n1
The single entrants profits are given by
(17)

Ila=

[p -

Assuming that 0

(0

2

- Za) - c](n

2

- 0

location between 0

1

7K

1

~lSn ,

1

+ n2 )

- K

so that entry deterrence is possible at any

2

and 0, the single entrant will prefer to set Za = 0

1

and sell only to type one consumers or to set Z = 0 and sell to both types
a

of consumers as (0
(iv)

- 0) ~ 2/3

2

(p -

c).

Two entrants, each selling to a single market.

The first entrant

may not be able to deter further entry (as would be the case if, for instance,
>.. = 2/3 and 0

entry.

2

- 0

1

>

7Kn )
or else riot find it profitable to deter further

12

2
In this case the first entrant will establish Z = 0 and the second
a
1

Zb • 02.
Thus, like d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) we find that when two
firms do enter there is no tendency for them to locate adjacent to one another,
contrary to Hotelling's (1929) "principle of minimwn differentiation."
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4.

Threat of Entry, Welfare and Distrib ution
Accord ing to the contes table market s theory of increas ing return s to

ing
scale indust ries, the threat of entry serves the desirab le role of enforc
efficie ncy (see, e.g., Baum.al, 1982).

If increas ing returns take the form of

ul
sunk fixed costs, howeve r, the threat of entry can lead to social ly wastef
locatio n decisio ns.

Welfare may be raised by the elimin ation of all potent ial

entran ts, i.e., by establi shing a franch ise monopo ly.
Consid er the case in which there is only a single entran t selling to a
single mark.et .

Social welfare is at a maximum when Za =

e1 , i.e., when the

the
model produc ed by the single entran t corresp onds to the ideal model of
consum ers it sells to.

The threat of additio nal entry may cause a single

ers in
entran t to modify its produc t in the directi on of the tastes of consum
anothe r market to preclud e entry by a firm servici ng that mark.et .

In the

,
resulti ng equilib rium the single entran t will not sell to this second market
yet its presen ce will have modifie d the model produc ed.

The firm's profit s

are conseq uently lower while no consum er's welfar e is higher .

The threat of

entry thus, leads to s~ciall y waste(~l_strateg~c behavior on the_p~ rt
entran t.

0£° a single ·

Social welfare would be higher if further entry were prohib ited.

The first entran t's decisio n to modify its model consti tutes the
establi shmen t of a artific ial monopo ly. (Dixit 1980).

Anothe r exampl e of

is
such behavi or by·an initial entran t, which has receive d some attenti on,
the first entran t's decisio n to invest in capaci ty beyond the level that
short run
is efficie nt to produc e the optima l monopoly output , thereby lowerin g
vis
margin al cost and enhanci ng the first entran t's compe titive positio n vis-a-

potent ial entran ts.

(See, e.g., Spence , 1977; Dixit, 1980; Eaton and Lipsey

1980, 1981; Brande r and Spence r, 1982.)

In this case, howeve r, under an

optima l
artific ial monopo ly, price and output may be closer to their social ly
levels than under a franch ise monopoly (i.e., with restric ted entry) .

The
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threat of entry in this case can engender strategic behavior that is welfare
improving.

When this artificial monopoly is achieved by biasing model

choice, however, it is not the case that entry deterrence lowers effective
price and raises output.

It is purely wasteful.

We discuss the effects of international trade on welfare at length elsewhere
(Eaton and Kierzkowski, 1982).

It is worth mentioning here that in the case

just considered a social gain results from prohibiting trade between markets.
With trade prohibited two firms rather than one can establish production, each
servicing one market.

z1 = e1 and charging

The first entrant will. earn a higher profit, establishing

p,

while a second entrant with z
2

will earn positive profits as well.

= e2 ,

also charging p,

Prohibiting trade thus constitutes a

superior policy to precluding further entry while both policies dominate laissez
faire.
Entry deterrence

can also lead to a redistribution of income from a

firm to consumers in the larger market.

This occurs when a single firm sells

to both markets but biases his product toward the taste of consumers in the
larger market to preclude further entry.

Consumers in the larger market

consequently pay a price below their reservation price
the firm's profits are below maximum profits if further entry were precluded.
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5.

Growth and Welfare
The literature on increasing returns to scale provides many examples

in which growth in the form of an increase in the number of consumers raises
welfare. 9

In the model developed in sections 2 and 3 the effect of market

growth on welfare is ambiguous, and an increase in the number of consumers
can result in a Pareto inferior outcome.
Consider the case in which there is a single entrant selling only to
the larger market.

An increase in the number of consumers in the smaller

market may, given the model produced by the single entrant, allow a second
entrant to establish production and sell to the smaller market.

To deter

entry the first entrant may modify its product to correspond more closely
to the taste of consumers in the smaller market, even though in the resulting
equilibrium no sales are made to those consumers.
to the larger market at a lower price.
no consumer's utility is higher.

The single entrant must sell

Its profits are consequently lower while

Thus growth in the size of the smaller market

yields a Pareto inferior outcome.
Welfare does not fall monotonically as the number of consumers in the
smaller market increases, however.

Eventually, entry deterrence becomes un

profitable or infeasible so that two firms enter, each producing the ideal
model for one market.

At this point further increases in the number of type 2

consumers benefit both firms and type 2 consumers while harming type 1 consumers.
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6~

Taste Differences and Welfare
The disparity of tastes in an economy can be represented by the distance

between the ideal models of type 2 and type 1 consumers.

It is interesting

to compare consumer utility and firm profits in an economy where tastes are
disparate (0

2

- 0

1

is large) with utility and profits in an economy of equal

size where tastes are similar (0

2

- 0 is small).
1

Alternatively, if the model

characteristic Z corresponds literally to its location on a line and if trans
portation costs are linear in distance a decrease in 0

2

-

e1

may be interpreted

as a reduction in transportation costs.
Consider first the case in which markets are sufficiently large and tastes
everywhere sufficiently disparate to allow entry by two firms.
lower in the economy in which tastes are similar.

Prices will be

Consumers will thus be better

off and firms worse off than in the economy in which tastes are disparate.
In the case in which tastes are everywhere sufficiently similar to allow
only one entrant, the producer will never earn less where tastes are more
similar while in most configurations consumers are unaffected by the difference
in taste disparity.

An exception arises when the single firm sells to both

markets but biases its model toward the taste of the larger market to deter
entry.

The bias will be less where tastes are similar and consumers in the

larger market are consequently worse off.
Finally, if the economy in which tastes are disparate can sustain two
producers while the one in which they are similar can sustain only one,
consumers benefit from taste disparity.

The successful entrant in the economy

where tastes are similar will earn more than either firm in the economy where
tastes are disparate.

In summary,fleither firmsnor consumers nec~ssarily

benefit or lose from a reduction in the disparity of tastes.
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7.

Technology Transfer
We have assumed that each entrant has access to a potentially dif

ferent technology.

In this section we consider conditions under which

a sale of technology from an efficient to an inefficient producer is
sustainable in a market equilibrium.
Consider a situation in which there are many potential producers.
Only one, firm a, however, has access to a technology that allows
produce at marginal cost c.

The rest only have the ability to produce at

a

marginal cost cb > Ca•

it to

We assume that firm a is always the initial

entrant, possibly because it can sell at a price below cb and sustain non
negative profits, thus under-bidding any previous entrant.
7.1

Technology Transfer that Leads to Entry
We first consider a situation in which, at the initial levels of ca and cb,

the market is sufficiently small to allow firm a to preclude entry by establishing
any model between 0

1

and

0.

Firm a's profits are

Consider the case of a potential entrant purchasing for an amount T the
ability to produce
, at marginal cost c.
a

We assume that

its entry to the

market would lead to a new, long-run equilibrium in which Za = 0

1

and Zb = 0 ;
2

i.e., we assume that the initial entrant maintains the ability to choose the more
popular model.

We also assume that in the new equilibrium price competition
- 10
occurs so that p < p and p < p: Profits are then
a
b
(19)

0

1

)7 n
1

J

1

-K+T

(20)

For a sale of technology to be sustainable it must be the case that there exists

I

I

29

a T such that IT~>
aentran ts but only

IT· and IT'> o
Since there are many poten tial
a-- b- ·
one pro ducer wi th access to the effici ent techno logy,

Tis determ ined b Y th e zer.o profit condit ion for a poten tial entran t; i.e.
or
(21) T

= -K+ n
2

h
Subst itutio n (24) into (22) indica tes tat
sustai nabili ty requir es
(22)

(

2

+ 211. - 2>.. )
2 (02 - 01) (nl + n2) - 2K > IT a
1 - >.. + >..

1

Inspec tion of this condit ion reveal s that a transf er is more likely to be sustai n-

)
differ ences (0 2 - 0 1 ) and the overa ll marke t s1.·ze ( nl + n2,
_ c ). The last
and the smalle r the entry cost K and the monop oly markup (p
a
able the larger taste

relati onshi p indica tes that, ceteri s paribu s, a techno logy

transf er is less

likely to occur when the techno logy is highly ef,fici ent.

7.2 Techno logy Trans fer Between Succe ssful Entran ts.
to ca to
Consid er now the case in which ~ is suffic iently low relati ve
logy.
allow a second entran t in the absenc e of a transf er of techno

In this case,

prior to any transf er, profit s of the two firms are

(.23)

IT

(24)

a

=

ITb

(0 2 - 0 1 )]
+ (2 - A)
>..(cb - c)
·
a
n = K
[
2
l
1 - A+ >..

)] n - K
- 01_
(0 2___
(1 + A)
- cb) +____
(c _ ____
(1_- _>..)_ _a
___
_
2
.
2
A
A+
1

=[

y IT'> IT
a
For a transf er to occur the price T of the techno logy must satisf
a
and ~O), respec and ITb > ITb, where IT~ and. ITb contin ue to be define d by ( 19'
tively .

Contin uing to assume that the numbe r of poten tial entran ts with

of the techno logy
techno logy cb is large, and assumi ng now that any purcha ser
sell below
neces sarily becom es the second entran t (perha ps becaus e it could
cb and still realiz e a profit ) we define T by the condit ion

Ilb

=

ITb so that:
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(1 - A) (cb - ca)
T =

2
1 - A+ A

The first producer will .find a technology sale profitable iff

rr;

~Ila oriff A< 1/2.

Since we assumed initially that n

1

~

n

2

the

efficient producer will transfer technology only if the two markets
are of equal size, and then be indifferent between selling and not
selling.

More generally, an efficient producer can profit from selling

a more efficient technology to a firm in a larger market, even if the two
firms affect each other's price. It will not sell to a competing firm in a
smaller market, however.
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8.

Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of market structure which

combines elements of the theory of imperfect competition
As in models of imperfect competition there are,
of potential producers that
however, the number is fixed.

~

and oligopoly.

~ • a large number

are, in principle, free to enter.

~

post,

The nature of competition is thus different

from that in models in which markets are contestable in that there is
a fixed cost that must be assumed before prices are determined.

This

distinction implies that there is scope both for positive profits and
strategic entry-deterrence behavior.
In order to characterize equilibrium fully in closed fonn we
have made some very s~ecial assumptions about tastes and techriology.
Nevertheless, a number of our results are likely to remain under a more
general specification.

First, oligopolistic competition among firms

is likely to benefit consumers whose tastes are in the majority.

To

avoid penetration by other firms a firm selling to consumers in a large
market will have to charge a relatively lower price.

Conversely, a firm

selling to a small number of consumers can charge a higher price without
providing an incentive for another firm to lower its price in order to
sell to both markets.

Second, entry deterrence behavior may affect the

characteristics of products produced.

One possible modification is

toward the taste of consumers in a small market to preclude the emergence
of a second entrant catering to that market 9 even though no sales are
consequently made to the smaller market.
entry lowers welfare.

In this case the threat of

A second _possible modification is toward the taste

of consumers in larger market by: a firm selling to two markets.

Here

the threat of entry redistributes income from the firm toward consumers
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in the larger market.

A third result is that market growth can exacerbate

the distortions imposed by entry deterrence behavior.

Fourth, consumers

benefit from the greater intensity of competition in an economy where
other consl.lillers are not too different from them as long as the number of
producers remains the same.

When similarity of tastes among consumers

breeds such intense price competition among firms that entry is discouraged,
however, consumers lose.

Finally, when consumers differ sufficiently

in their tastes and when the number of consumers is sufficiently
large an incentive arises for an efficient firm to sell its superior
teclmology to other firms.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

In treating the model choice and pricing decisions as sequential rather

than simultaneous our treatment is isomorphic to Prescott and Visscher's
(1977) model of location choice.
2.

See also Lane (1980).

The non-existence of Nash-Bertrand equilibrium for the case in which the

two firms are located less than some critical distance apart resembles the result
of d'AspreI!lont, Gabszewiczand Thisse (1979) on the non-existence of a solution to
the Hotelling model.

They show that existence reemerges when transport costs are

made quadratic rather than linear.

This i~ not the cas~ whan individuals are

located at distinct points rather than along a continuum.

3.

In his analysis of insurance markets, Wilson (1977) provides an example

in which, when firms have more sophisticated beliefs about other firms' re
actions, equilibrium in pure strategies exists when it fails to obtain under
a Nash specification.
We assume throughout that pis sufficiently high to insure that p > p·*

p- > .p;.

1

= p and if the second is
1
violated p2 = -p. Wealso assume that p * ~ c and p * ~ c • Otherwise, firm 1
1
1
2
2
or firm 2 will not produce in equilibrium as the first or second
in-

and

If the first inequality is violated p

equality fails to obtain.
5.

See Bresnahan (1981) and Grossman (1981).

6.

Only models in the interval [0 , 0 ] are of interest.
1
2

Consider an equi

librium in which there is a firm producing a model a distanced above 0
(below

01 ).

2
There is a corresponding equiiibrium in which that firm locates

at 0 2 (0 1 ), charges a price greater by an amount d, and maintains its previous
level of sales.

Its profits are consequently higher.

The firm would have

chosen this location over the location outside the interval.

34

'
that
p* < c in the
a
a
Otherwise, the second entrant would sell to both markets

It is the case the cb cannot be so low relative to c
resulting equilibrium.
in·equilibrium.

a

The first entrant would experience a loss and consequently would

not have chosen to enter.

Again, we are assuming that in this equilibrium the

level pis not binding.
8.

Again, this result assumes that c

8

is not much higher than~•

the first entrant has a strong cost disadvantage

(i.e., if c 8

then the second entrant may nevertheless choose Zb •
p = ca even though Z.a = 0 •
1

If

>> cb):

e1 and sell at

In this case the first entrant would

have chosen Za = 0 •
2
Given that Za = 0

1

and Zb = 0 , a.third entrant cannot establish
2

production and earn a positive profit unless it has a strong cost advantage.
There is consequently no incentive for a firm to delay entry.

See

Shaked and Sutton (1982) for a model in which firms do have an incentive
to delay establishing a model.

9.

Hart (1979) and Novschek (1980) show that with free entr)l Coumot

equilibrium among firms converges to competitive equilibrium and a
Pareto optimum.

In these models entry and pricing decisions are sitrn.1ltaneous

so that free entry enforces average cost pricing.
10. If after the transfer, the two producers could charge pin their
markets, a technology transfer would necessarily be sustainable.
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